Following Pakistan’s recent airstrikes inside Afghan territory, a palpable sense of anxiety has gripped Afghanistan’s eastern provinces particularly in the Pashtun belt bordering Pakistan. In Kabul, Nangarhar, Khost, Paktika, and Paktia, a recurring question now dominates private conversations: Will there be more strikes? Whenever a major militant attack occurs inside Pakistan, Afghan citizens brace for possible retaliation across the border. This pattern of anticipation itself reflects the fragility of the current security environment.
Reports from Kabul suggest that senior officials within the ministries of interior and defense have been engaged in urgent deliberations over how to manage both the strategic fallout and the reputational costs of escalation. The dilemma is acute. A forceful response risks inviting broader retaliation from Pakistan; restraint, however, may be interpreted domestically as weakness. For the Afghan authorities, the challenge lies in balancing sovereignty claims with the realities of asymmetric vulnerability.
At the societal level, frustration is mounting. Informal conversations among Afghan journalists, traders, and former officials frequently revolve around the same grievance: that the presence or perceived tolerance of militant actors on Afghan soil exposes the country to punitive action. Whether these perceptions are fully accurate or not, they carry political consequences. Economic conditions have already deteriorated significantly. Border closures and trade disruptions translate rapidly into higher prices for medicine and essential commodities. For a landlocked country, trade corridors through Pakistan particularly via Karachi and Gwadar are not abstract geopolitical assets but lifelines.
From a strategic standpoint, the reliance on proxy actors has historically proven to be a double-edged instrument. Proxy warfare may provide short-term leverage, but it often generates long-term instability and international isolation. Academic literature on proxy conflicts consistently demonstrates that such arrangements tend to erode state sovereignty rather than strengthen it. Moreover, escalation dynamics between neighboring states rarely remain confined; they expand through miscalculation and retaliatory cycles.
Pakistan, for its part, frames its actions as counterterrorism measures aimed at neutralizing cross-border threats to its national security. If armed groups are operating from Afghan territory, Islamabad argues, it possesses both the right and the obligation to respond. The burden of preventing such usage of territory, under international norms, lies with the host authority. Conversely, Afghan civilians bear the humanitarian consequences of any kinetic response, reinforcing a growing domestic sentiment that Afghanistan should not serve as a theater for transnational militancy.
A critical question therefore emerges: can limited, calibrated force produce durable security outcomes, or does it merely entrench cycles of mistrust? History suggests that even the most entrenched proxy conflicts ultimately revert to negotiation tables. The intervening period, however, is marked by economic strain, civilian suffering, and reputational costs for all parties involved.
This moment is thus strategically consequential. If the Afghan authorities take credible steps to address cross-border militant concerns, space may open for de-escalation and structured dialogue. Failure to do so risks deepening Afghanistan’s isolation and inviting further coercive measures. Equally, sustained military responses absent diplomatic engagement could harden positions and destabilize an already volatile frontier.
For ordinary Afghans, the calculus is far less abstract. Their overriding aspiration is stability freedom from becoming collateral damage in regional rivalries. The Pashtun belt’s anxiety is not merely about aircraft or missiles; it is about the recurrence of a historical pattern in which geopolitical contestation overwhelms local livelihoods. The choice confronting both Kabul and Islamabad is whether to perpetuate that pattern or to disrupt it through responsible statecraft and mutual security guarantees.
