Since returning to power in 2021, the Taliban administration has embarked on a sweeping campaign to reclaim vast tracts of land across Afghanistan. This directive is the public face of the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy , a massive undertaking that has seen thousands of acres, including entire townships, declared state property.
An Anti-Corruption Drive or a Tool of Control?
Officially, the administration frames this as a righteous anti-corruption drive, designed to recover state land usurped by powerful figures and “land mafias” associated with the former republic. However, human rights organizations, UN reports, and affected residents describe a far more troubling reality. They argue this Taliban government’s land grabbing policy is a weapon of political retribution and ethnic discrimination, creating a new class of internally displaced persons and deepening one of the world’s worst humanitarian crises.
A Legal Framework with No Recourse
Officially, the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy is executed by the “Land-Grabbing Prevention and Restitution Commission”. Established by decree in October 2022 and operating under the Ministry of Justice, this high-level body is empowered to investigate land ownership and, with the backing of “special courts,” restore allegedly usurped land to state control. The commission has announced the reclamation of millions of acres nationwide.
The legal trap of this system, however, lies in its documentation standards. The commission largely rejects ‘orfi qabala’ (customary deeds), the informal but socially recognized documents that prove ownership for an estimated 80 percent of Afghanistan’s population. By exclusively accepting ‘sharie qabala’ (official state-issued deeds), which are rare, the commission can legally reclassify almost any property as “usurped”.
For those caught in this system, there is virtually no recourse. Reports from numerous provinces confirm that affected landowners are barred from filing legal appeals or even publicizing their ownership documents. The U.S. State Department has noted that the Taliban effectively eliminated the appeals process, rendering judicial proceedings “opaque and arbitrary”. Victims of the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy are often given an impossible choice: repurchase their own land, pay rent to the state, or face forced eviction.
The Human Cost of the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy
This is where the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy reveals its most alarming aspect: selective targeting. Human Rights Watch (HRW) has extensively documented forced evictions of ethnic and religious minorities, particularly Hazara communities, in provinces like Ghazni, Daikundi, Balkh, and Maidan Wardak.
HRW has described these evictions as “collective punishment” and a method to “reward Taliban supporters” with seized land. In Sar-e-Pol, ethnic Uzbek and Tajik communities have marched in protest against what they call “ethnic oppression” after the administration attempted to seize thousands of acres of their land.
Simultaneously, the policy targets political rivals. High-profile seizures, such as the Haji Qadir and Ishaq Gilani townships in Nangarhar, are direct blows to the power bases of influential families from the previous government. This dual-track targeting of both ethnic minorities and former political opponents is a hallmark of the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy.
Instead of healing decades-old wounds over land, which have long fueled conflict in Afghanistan, the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy appears to be weaponizing them. It punishes ordinary citizens who may have purchased plots in good faith from now-deposed strongmen. These evictions, often carried out just before the harvest or the onset of winter, are creating new waves of internal displacement in a nation already on the brink. In essence, the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy is not an anti-corruption measure but a tool of absolute control, one that secures assets for the state while dispossessing its most vulnerable populations.
Conclusion
In conclusion, the Taliban government’s land grabbing policy operates on two levels. Publicly, it is a campaign for order and the restoration of state assets. In practice, however, it functions as a powerful mechanism for consolidating power, rewarding supporters, and dispossessing minorities and former political rivals. By systematically dismantling property rights and eliminating legal recourse, the administration is not solving Afghanistan’s long-standing land conflicts but is instead institutionalizing a new, state-directed form of dispossession, further destabilizing the lives of its most vulnerable citizens.
Also See: Revealing Regional Linkages and Challenging Taliban–GDI Coercive Rule
