The pursuit of dialogue as a means to end insurgency is an instinct for any state wishing to avoid bloodshed. From the Shakai Agreement in 2004 to the Kabul ceasefire talks in 2022, Islamabad continued to extend olive branches to the TTP, hoping that talks could silence the guns. But every handshake often led to a deadlier tomorrow. Deals that were meant to end violence became incubators of militancy, giving insurgents time to regroup, recruit, and return stronger.
Far from delivering peace, these agreements became Pakistan’s most dangerous illusions. Villages were overrun, schools were torched, soldiers executed, and entire valleys lost to militant control under the guise of “peace.” The pattern is too consistent to ignore: dialogue has repeatedly failed, while decisive operations, though painful, reclaimed territory, dismantled networks, and restored fragile stability.
The Mirage of Peace Deals: A History of Strategic Deception
Each agreement with the TTP was packaged as a breakthrough, but in reality, it was a lifeline for militants to reload and reassert control. The Shakai Agreement of April 2004 with Nek Muhammad crumbled within weeks as militants assassinated tribal elders and resumed ambushes with greater ferocity. The Sararogha Pact of February 2005 elevated Baitullah Mehsud but failed almost immediately.
The September 2006 Waziristan Accord dismantled checkpoints, released prisoners, and ceded policing authority, only to see suicide attacks surge tenfold the following year. As Seth Jones observes, “cease-fires in insurgencies often give militants the very space and legitimacy they need to come back stronger.”
The same script was repeated in Swat. The February 2009 Nizam-e-Adl accord ceded judicial authority to militant actors, prompting Human Rights Watch to warn it would erode civilian rights. Within months, militants tightened control, forcing the military to launch Operation Rah-e-Rast in May 2009. Nearly two million civilians were displaced, underscoring how truces created humanitarian catastrophes rather than resolving crises, which began in 2021–22.
Most recently, the Kabul-hosted talks, which began in 2021–22, collapsed by November 2022. NACTA reported that terrorist attacks rose from an average of 14.5 per month in 2020 to 45.8 in 2022, confirming that ceasefires gave the TTP room to regroup. Ahmed Rashid, in his book Descent into Chaos, similarly observed that Waziristan truces allowed the Taliban and Al-Qaeda to entrench and expand. By the time talks were attempted in Kabul, the lesson was searingly clear: dialogue without leverage does not end wars; it prolongs them.
Unreconcilable Ideology and Fragmentation:
Beyond history, the TTP’s ideology makes peace structurally impossible. The group demands the overthrow of Pakistan’s government and the enforcement of a rigid interpretation of Sharia, nationwide goals irreconcilable with Pakistan’s constitution. The collapse of the 2014 talks, after the TTP executed 23 soldiers, highlighted this chasm.
Structurally, the TTP is a decentralized coalition of factions. Agreements with central leadership meant little on the ground, as splinter groups disavowed deals and continued violence. Hassan Abbas, in Pakistan’s Drift into Extremism, notes that such decentralization makes any settlement inherently fragile.
The Necessity of Decisive Operations:
If dialogue consistently failed, military action delivered measurable results. After the June 2014 Karachi Airport attack, Pakistan launched Operation Zarb-e-Azb in North Waziristan. With 20,000–30,000 troops deployed, the operation killed around 3,500 militants and drove attacks to their lowest levels since 2008. Yet the human cost was immense: nearly 930,000 civilians were displaced.
To consolidate gains, Operation Radd-ul-Fasaad (2017) shifted to nationwide intelligence-based operations over 375,000 by 2021, resulting in more than 7,000 militants killed and over 1,300 surrenders. A border fence was erected to block Afghan sanctuaries. Terrorism fatalities steadily declined, proving that sustained campaigns, coupled with governance, were far more effective than fragile truces.
The Strategic and Human Cost of Failed Deals
Failed truces did more than delay peace; they enabled the enemy. During ceasefires, the TTP expanded taxation systems, courts, and training camps. 2009 alone saw nearly 11,700 terrorism-related deaths, one of the bloodiest years in Pakistan’s history.
Economically, terrorism inflicted an estimated $150 billion cost on Pakistan since 2001, draining investment and development. Brookings Institution studies emphasized that every failed deal prolonged this “security tax,” while ceding rule of law to militants created systemic abuses against civilians. As Christine Fair argues in Fighting to the End, appeasement of militants rarely produces peace it produces impunity.
The Uncomfortable Truth
The record of two decades is a clear and sobering one. From Shakai in 2004 to Kabul in 2022, every peace deal with the TTP collapsed, leaving the state weaker and militants stronger. Dialogue gave militants legitimacy, time, and space to regroup, while civilians bore the brunt of resurging violence. By contrast, large-scale operations like Zarb-e-Azb and Radd-ul-Fasaad dismantled sanctuaries, reduced attacks, and restored state authority even at steep human and economic cost. The bitter truth is that dialogue with an ideologically irreconcilable and structurally fragmented foe is futile. Pakistan’s survival has depended, and will continue to depend on decisive military action paired with governance and rehabilitation, not illusions of peace.
